Abstract
Introduction and Motivation
Web servers continue to be attractive targets for attackers seeking to steal or destroy data, deny user access or embarrass organizations by changing web site contents. Furthermore, because web servers must be publicly available around the clock, the server is an easy target for outside intruders. In order to penetrate their targets, attackers may exploit well-known service vulnerabilities. A web server can be subverted through vulnerable CGI scripts, which may be exploited by meta characters or buffer overflow attacks. These vulnerabilities may be related to the default installation of the server or may be introduced by careless writing of custom scripts.
Web servers are also popular targets for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. An attacker sends a stream of connection requests to a server in an attempt to crash or slow down the service. Launching a DoS attack against a web server can be accomplished in many ways, including ill-formed HTTP requests (e.g., a large number of HTTP headers). As the server tries to process such requests it slows down and becomes unable to process other requests. In addition, web servers exhibit susceptibility to password guessing attacks.
To address these risks, web servers require increased security protection. Effective system security starts with security policies that are supported by an access control mechanism. Access control policy to be enforced should depend on the current state of the system, e.g., time of day, system load or system threat level. More restrictive organizational policies may be enforced after hours, when the system is busy or if suspicious activity has been detected. Unfortunately, many web servers (e.g., Apache and IIS) support only limited identity-and host-based policies that deny/allow access to protected resources. The policies are checked only when an access request is received to determine whether the request should be permitted or forbidden. These policies do not support observing and reporting suspicious activity (e.g., embedding hexadecimal characters in a query) and modifying system protection as a result.
Thus, the security policies must not only specify legitimate user privileges but also aid in the detection of threats and adapt their behavior based on perceived system threat conditions. Even a single instance of a request for a vulnerable CGI script or malformed request should be reported immediately and countermeasures should be applied. Such countermeasures may include: -generating audit records; -notifying network servers that are monitoring security rel-evant events in the system; -tightening local policies (e.g., restricting access to local users only or requesting extra credentials); -modifying overall system protection. Examples include terminating the session, logging the user off the system, disabling local account or blocking connections from particular parts of the network or stopping selected services (e.g., disable ssh connections). These actions would be followed by an alert to the security administrator, who can then assess the situation and take the appropriate corrective actions. This step is important, since an automated response to attacks can be used by an intruder in order to stage a DoS (the intruder could have impersonated a host or a user).
Traditional access control mechanisms were not designed to aid the detection of threats or to adjust their behavior based on perceived threat conditions. Common countermeasures to web server threats depend on separate components like firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and code integrity checkers. While these components are useful in detecting some kinds of attacks, they do not fully address a web server's security needs. For example, firewalls can deny access to unauthorized network connections, but they can not stop attacks coming in via authorized ports. In the general case, IDSs provide only incomplete coverage, leaving sophisticated attacks undetected. Other disadvantages include: large number of false positives and inability to preemptively respond to attacks. Integrity checkers can detect unauthorized changes to files on a web site, but only after the damage has been done.
Motivated by the multitude of web server vulnerabilities and generally unsatisfactory server protection, we propose integrated approach to web server security -the Generic Authorization and Access-control API (GAA-API) that supports fine-grained access control and application level intrusion detection and response.
The GAA-API evaluates HTTP requests and determines whether the requests are allowed and if they represent a threat according to a policy. Our approach differs from other work done in this area by supporting access control policies extended with the capability to identify (and possibly classify) intrusions and respond to the intrusions in real time. The policy enforcement takes three phases: 1. Before requested operation (e.g., display an HTML file or run a CGI program) starts; to decide whether this operation is authorized. 2. During the execution of the authorized operation; to detect malicious behavior in real-time (e.g., a user process consumes excessive system resources). 3. When the operation is completed; to activate post execution actions, such as logging and notification whether the operation succeeds/fails. For example, alerting that a particular critical file (e.g., /etc/passwd) was modified can trigger a process to check the contents of the file (e.g., check for a null password).
By being integrated with the web server and having the ability to control the three processing steps of the requested operation, the GAA-API can respond to suspected intrusion in real-time before it causes damage, whether it is site defacement, data theft or a DoS attack.
The disadvantage of the proposed approach is that a web server has to be modified in order to utilize the GAA-API. However, once the relatively easy integration is completed, it becomes possible to handle access control decisions and application level intrusion detection simultaneously. Furthermore, since the GAA-API is a generic tool, it can be used by a number of different applications with no modifications to the API code. In this paper we focus on the web server. However, the API can provide enhanced security for applications with different security requirements. We have integrated the GAA-API with Apache web server, sshd and FreeS/WAN IPsec for Linux.
Policy Representation
The Extended Access Control List (EACL) is a simple language that we implemented to describe security policies that govern access to protected resources, identify threats that may occur within application and specify intrusion response actions. An EACL is associated with an object to be protected and specifies positive and negative access rights with optional set of associated conditions that describe the context in which each access right is granted or denied. An EACL describes more than one set of disjoint policies. The policy evaluation mechanism is extended with the ability to read and write system state. The implementation is based on conditions that provide support for monitoring and updating internal system structures and their runtime behaviors.
A condition may either explicitly list the value of a constraint or specify where the value can be obtained at run time. The latter allows for adaptive constraint specification, since alowble times, locations and thresholds can change in the event of possible security attacks. The value of condition can be supplied by other services, e.g., an IDS.
In our framework, all conditions are classified as:
1. pre-conditions specify what must be true in order to grant or deny the request, e.g., access identity, time, location and system threat level.
2. request-result conditions must be activated whether the authorization request is granted or whether the request is denied, e.g., audit and notification.
3. mid-conditions specify what must be true during the execution of the requested operation, e.g., a CPU usage threshold that must hold during the operation execution.
4. post-conditions are used to activate post execution actions, such as logging and notification whether the operation succeeds/fails.
Failure of some of these conditions may signal suspicious behavior,e.g., access is requested at unexpected times or unusual locations. Some conditions can trigger defensive measures in response to a perceived system threat level, e.g., impose a limit on resource consumption or increase auditing.
A condition block defines a conjunction of a totally ordered set of conditions. Conditions are evaluated in the order they appear within a condition block.
An EACL entry consists of a positive or negative access right and four optional condition blocks: a set of preconditions, a set of request-result conditions, a set of midconditions and a set of post-conditions.
An EACL consists of an ordered set of disjunctive EACL entries. An EACL representation supports disjunction and conjunction of conditions to activate different control modes. A transition between the disjoint EACL entries is regulated automatically by reading the system state (e.g., time of day or the system threat level). Detailed EACL syntax is given in the Appendix.
In the current framework, the evaluation of entries within an EACL and evaluation of conditions within an EACL entry is totally ordered. Evaluation of an EACL starts from the first to the last in the list of EACL entries. The resolution of inconsistent authorizations is based on ordering. The entries which already have been examined take precedence over new entries.
The order has to be assessed before EACL evaluation starts. Determining the evaluation order is currently done by a policy officer. We recognize that the function of defining the order of EACL entries and conditions within an entry can be best served by an automated tool to ensure policy correctness and consistency and to ease the policy specification burden on the policy officer. We plan to design and implement such tool in the future. For further details about the authorization model see [4] .
The GAA-API provides a general-purpose execution environment in which EACLs are evaluated.
Policy Composition
Policy Composition is a process of relating separately specified policies. Our framework supports system-wide and local policies. This separation is useful for efficient policy management. Instead of repeating policies that apply to all applications in individual application policies, we define these policies as a separate system-wide policy that is applied globally and is consulted on all the accesses to all applications. Local policies allow users and applications to define their own policy in addition to the global one.
The composed policy is constructed by merging the system-wide and local policies. First, system-wide policies are retrieved and placed at the beginning of the list of policies. Then the local policies are retrieved and added to the list. Thus, system-wide policies implicitly have higher priority than the local policies.
A system-wide policy specifies a composition mode that describes how local policies are to be composed with the system-wide policy. The framework supports three composition modes: expand A system-wide policy broadens the access rights beyond those granted by local policies. It is the equivalent of a disjunction of the rights. The access is allowed if either the system-wide or the local policy allows the access. This is useful to ensure that a request permitted by the system-wide policy can not fail due to access rejection at the local level. narrow A system-wide policy narrows the access rights so that objects can not be accessed under particular conditions regardless of the local policies. The policy that controls access to an object may have mandatory and discretionary components. Generally, mandatory policy is set by the domain administrator, while discretionary policy is set by individuals or applications. The mandatory policies must always hold. The discretionary policies must be satisfied in addition to the mandatory policies. Thus, the resulting policy represents the conjunction of the mandatory and discretionary policies.
stop If a system-wide policy exists, that policy is applied and local policies are ignored. An administrator may require complete overriding of the local policies with the system-wide policies. This is useful in order to react quickly to an attack. One might use the stop mode to shut down certain component systems. This is also useful when the administrator wants to, for example, allow access to a document (e.g., a system log file) only to himself. If he specifies a policy using the expand mode, then additional access can be granted at the local level. If he uses narrow mode, the local policies could add additional restrictions that can deny the access.
To evaluate several separately specified local (or systemwide) policies, we take a conjunction of the policies.
GAA-API and IDS interactions
The data extracted from an application at the access control time can be supplemented with data from a network-and host-based IDSs to detect attacks not visible at the application level and reduce the false alarm rate.
The current GAA-API interaction with an IDS is limited to determining the current system threat profile and adapting the security policy to respond to changing security requirements. Our next task is to support closer interaction be-tween the GAA-API and different IDSs. Here are the kinds of information 1 that the GAA-API can report to an IDS:
1. Ill-formed access requests, which may signal an attack. Because the GAA-API processes access requests by applications, the API can apply application level knowledge to determine whether the request is properly formed.
2. Accesses requests with parameters that are abnormally large or violate site's policy.
3. Access denial to sensitive system objects.
4. Violating threshold conditions, e.g., the number of failed login attempts within a given period of time.
5. Detected application level attacks. The report may include threat characteristics, such as attack type and severity, confidence value and defensive recommendations.
6. Unusual or suspicious application behavior such as creating files.
7. Legitimate access request patterns. This information can be used to derive profiles that describe typical behavior of users working with different applications.
The GAA-API can request a network-based IDS to report, for example, indications of address spoofing. This information can be used in addition to the application level attack signatures to further reduce the false positive rate and avoid DoS attacks. This is particularly important for applying pro active countermeasures, such as updating firewall rules and dropping connections.
The API can request information for adjusting policies, such as values for thresholds, times and locations. The values may depend on many factors and can be determined by a host-based IDS and communicated to the GAA-API.
Apache Access Control
Apache's access control system provides a method for web masters to allow or deny access to certain URL paths, files, or directories. Access can be controlled by requiring username and password information or by restricting the originating IP address of the client request. Access control is usually confined to specific directories of the document tree. When processing client's request to access a document Apache looks for an access control file called .htaccess in every directory of the path to the document. Here is a sample .htaccess file: The "Allow from 10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0" allows connections only from hosts within the specified IP range. All other hosts will get a "Permission Denied" message. The "Require valid-user" requires that the user enter a username and password. These username/password pairs are stored in a separate file specified by the "AuthUserFile" directive.
Adding GAA-API to Enhance the Access Control of the Apache Server
Unfortunately, the current version of Apache does not support flexible fine-grained policies. Within the Apache configuration file, the directive Satisfy All specifies that both of the constraints on IP address and user authentication should be satisfied to authorize an access request. Satisfy Any means that the request will be granted if either of the two constraints is met. However, these directives can not express a policy with logical relations among three or more constraints. Therefore, new semantics must be introduced to specify a more flexible access control policy. Here are the major advantages of the integration:
1. Besides making decisions of whether a request is accepted or rejected, the GAA-API libraries provide routines that can execute certain actions, such as logging information, notifying administrator, etc. Furthermore, the routines can be activated whether the request succeeds/fails (when defined as request-result conditions) or whether the requested operation succeeds/fails (when defined as post-conditions). Thus, the GAA-API supports fine-tuning of the notification and audit services.
2. The GAA-API is structured to support the addition of modules for evaluation of new conditions. Web masters can write their own routines to evaluate conditions or execute actions and register them with the GAA-API. Moreover, the routines can be loaded dynamically so that one does not need to recompile the whole Apache package to add new routines.
3. The semantics of EACL format supported by the GAA-API can represent all logical combinations of security constraints.
4. The GAA-API supports adaptive security policies, which detect security breaches and respond to attacks by modifying security measures automatically. 
GAA-Apache Access Control
The GAA-API is integrated into Apache by modifying the check dir access function. The "glue" code extracts the information about requests from the Apache core modules, initializes the GAA-API, calls the API functions to evaluate policies, and finally returns access control decision and status values to the modules. The GAA-Apache integration is shown in Figure 1 . The GAA-API makes use of system-wide and local configuration and policy files. The configuration files list routines and parameters for evaluating conditions specified in the policy files. The system-wide policy applies to all applications in the system. The local 3 status values: GAA Y E S -all conditions are met; GAA NO-at least one of the conditions fails; GAA MAYBE-none of the conditions fails but there is at least one condition that is left unevaluated. The GAA-API returns GAA MAYBEif the corresponding condition evaluation function is not registered with the API.
1. Initialization phase. When the server daemon of Apache starts, first the GAA-API is initialized by calling gaa initialze and gaa new sc that extract and register condition evaluation and policy retrieval routines from the system and local configuration files, fetch the system policy file, and generate internal structures for later use.
2. The access control phase starts with receiving a request to access an object (e.g., HTML file or CGI script).
(a) The gaa get object policy info function is called to obtain the security policies associated with the requested object. The function reads the system-wide policy file, converts it to the internal EACL representation and places it at the beginning of the list of EACLs. Next, the function retrieves and translates the local policy file and adds it to the list. The system and local policies are composed as described in Section 2.1.
(b) The request is converted into a list of requested rights. The context information (e.g., system configuration, server status, client status and the details of access request) that may be used by the condition evaluation routines is extracted from the request rec structure and is added to requested right structure as a list of parameters. These parameters are classified with "type" and "authority" so that GAA-API routines that evaluate conditions with the same type and authority could find the relevant parameters.
(c) Next, the gaa check authorization function is called to check whether the requested right is authorized by the the ordered list of EACLs. This function finds the EACL entries where the the requested right appears and calls the registered routines to evaluate pre-and request-result conditions in the entries. If there are no pre-conditions, the authorization status is set to GAA Y E S . Otherwise, the pre-conditions are evaluated and the result is stored in the authorization status S a .
If the request-result conditions are present in the entry, the conditions are evaluated and the intermediate result is calculated. The conjunction of the intermediate result and S a is stored in the authorization status S a . (d) Finally, the status S a is translated to the Apache format and is passed to the Apache core modules as a return value of the check dir access function. GAA Y E Sis translated to H TTPOK (Apache can grant the request). GAA NOis translated to HTTP DECLINED(Apache should reject the request). In some cases, the GAA MAYBE is translated to HTTP AUTHREQUIRED, in other cases to HTTP DECLINED. In particular, the GAA MAYBEis used to enforce adaptive redirection policies. Apache may use the redirection for minimizing the network delay, load balancing or security reasons. For example, redirect to a replica server that is closest to the client in terms of network distance. The redirection policies encoded in the preconditions specify, characteristics of a client, current system state and URL that must serve the client. With this setup, the GAA-API first checks the pre-conditions that encode client's information and system state. The condition of type pre cond redirect encodes the URL and is returned unevaluated. When Apache receives the HTTP AUTHREQUIRED , the server checks whether there is only one unevaluated condition of the type pre cond redirect and creates a redirected request using the URL from the condition value. 
Deployments
In this section we describe several examples to illustrate how our framework can be deployed to enable fine-grained access control and intrusion detection and response.
Network Lockdown
We first show how our system adapts the applied authentication policies to require more information from a user when system threat level changes. Consider an organization with the following characteristics:
Mixed access to web services. Access to some web resources require user authentication, some do not.
An IDS supplies a system threat level. For example, low threat level means normal system operational state, medium threat level indicates suspicious behavior and high threat level means that the system is under attack. Policy: When system threat level is higher than low, lock down the system and require user authentication for all accesses within the network. Strong authentication protects against outside intruders. To some extent, authentication may help to reduce insider misuse. In particular, insiders are discouraged if the identity of a user can be established reliably.
System-wide policy:
eacl mode 1 # composition mode narrow # EACL entry 1 neg access right * * pre cond system threat level local =high
Local policy:
# EACL entry 1 pos access right apache * pre cond system threat level local >low pre cond accessID USER apache * The system-wide policy specifies mandatory requirement "No access is allowed when system threat level is high" that can not be bypassed by a local policy. The local policy specifies that all Apache accesses have to be authenticated if the system threat level is higher than "low".
Application level Intrusion Detection
We next show how the system supports prevention of penetration and/or surveillance attacks by detecting a CGI script abuse. System-wide policy:
eacl mode 1 # composition mode narrow # EACL entry 1 neg access right * * pre cond accessID GROUP local BadGuys Local policy:
# EACL entry 1 neg access right apache * pre cond regex gnu '''*phf*' '*test-cgi*''' rr cond notify local on:failure/email:sysadmin/info:CGIexploit rr cond update log local on:failure/BadGuys/info:IP # EACL entry 2 pos access right apache * Entry 1 in the system-wide policy specifies mandatory requirement that members of the group BadGuys are denied access. Evaluation of the pre-condition pre cond group includes reading a log file of the suspicious IP addresses and trying to find an IP address that matches the address the request was sent from. Entry 1 in the local policy contains a pre-condition pre cond regex that examines the request for occurrence of regular expressions *phf* and *test-cgi*. If no match is found, the GAA-API proceeds to the next EACL entry that grants the request.
If this condition is met, the request is rejected. The rr cond notify condition sends e-mail to the system administrator reporting time, IP address, URL attempted and a threat type. Next, the rr cond update log updates the group BadGuys to include new suspicious IP address from the request.
New signatures can be specified using regular expressions and numeric comparison. For example, the following pre-condition detects a particular DoS attack:
pre cond regex gnu '*///////////////////*' Evaluation of this condition includes checking the request for presence of a large number of "/" characters that most likely indicates an attempt to exploit a well-known apache bug that slows down Apache and fills up logs fast.
The pre-condition pre cond regex gnu '*%*' detects malformed URLs (part of the URL contains the percent character). This may indicate ongoing attack, such as NIMDA. NIMDA exploits Microsoft IIS vulnerabilities by sending a malformed GET request.
The pre-condition pre cond expr local >1000 checks that the length of input to a CGI script is no longer than 1000 characters. This condition detects a buffer overflow attacks, e.g., Code Red IIS attack.
Adding suspicious hosts to the BadGuys may allow our system to stop attacks with unknown signatures. Often vulnerabilities are tested by scripts that generate a number of requests. Each request exploits a particular bug. If the system identifies requests from an address as matching known attack signature, then subsequent requests from that host (initiated by the same script), checking for vulnerabilities we might not yet know about, can still be blocked. Further, since this blacklist is specified in a system-wide policy, the list is shared by many of our hosts that improves security of the system overall.
Performance
In our experiment, we used the system-wide and local policy files shown in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. The experiment was performed 20 times on a PC with an Intel 1.8GHz Pentium 4 CPU, running RedHat Linux v7.1.
On average, GAA-API functions took 5.9 milliseconds (ms) without email notification (53.3 ms with email notification) while running Apache functions including GAA-API functions took 19.4 ms (66.8 ms with email notification). The overhead introduced by the GAA-API is 30% if email notification is not taken into account. If the email notification is enabled, the overhead increases to 80%.
Implementation Status and Future Work
The GAA-API implementation is available at http://www.isi.edu/gost/info/gaaapi/source. The API has been integrated with several applications, including Apache, sshd and FreeS/WAN IPsec for Linux.
To improve efficiency of the GAA-Apache integration we will add support for caching of the retrieved and translated policies for later reuse by subsequent requests. We will investigate a possibility of implementing a simple profile building module and anomaly detector (implemented using conditions) to support anomaly-based intrusion detection in addition to the signature-based.
We plan to implement the execution control phase for Apache. We will explore the utility of mid-conditions for protection from untrusted downloaded code, such as Java applets and Netscape plug-ins. The mid-conditions will control actions of the downloaded content on a client machine throughout the execution of the content.
